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The Environmental Liability Act (Umwelthaftungsgesetz) enacted January 1,
1991 is claimed to have substantially tightened the environmental liability re-
gime in Germany. The economic consequences of the amendment of the Ger-
man environmental liability legislation initiated by the Sandoz accident are in-
vestigated for a portfolio of firms in the chemical industry. By means of an event
study it is determined whether the UmweltHG has led to a revision of expecta-
tions regarding the profitability of the German chemical industry. If sizeable
precautionary pollution control measures and liability payments were to be
induced by the UmweltHG, both the returns and the risk attached to investing in
the chemical industry should be negatively affected. The findings of this study,
however, do not indicate that the German Environmental Liability Act induced
such a negative impact on the chemical industry.
J.E.L-Klassifikation: G14, K32, L651. Overview
In January 1991, the Environmental Liability Act (Umwelthaftungsgesetz,
UmweltHG) brought about what was thought to be a major change in the Ger-
man environmental liability regime. The UmweltHG introduced a strict liability
for damages caused by the pollution of certain environmentally significant facili-
ties.
1 The strict liability covers air, water and soil pollution. Moreover, the law
reverses the burden of proof and provides for a causality presumption such that
if the operation of a certain facility is inherently suited to cause the harm in-
curred, it is presumed that this facility has actually caused the damage, unless
the facility's operator can prove otherwise. In addition, the UmweltHG provides
the claimant with a right obtain certain information from both the operator of the
facility and government authorities (Hoffman 1991)! Given these far-reaching
provisions, the Federal government expected the law to constitute an effective
means of preventive environmental policy. Six years after the introduction of
the UmweltHG, the question arises to what extent these ambitions have been
accomplished.
The UmweltHG is subject to a substantial debate both from a legal and an eco-
nomic perspective. From a legal point of view, the interpretation of the
UmweltHG diverges until the present. Some scholars take the view that the law
brought about a dramatic legislative change (e.g. Schmidt-Salzer [1996, 63]).
Others doubt that liability for environmental damages has in fact been tightened
by the UmweltHG (e.g. Hoffman [1991, 28]). From an economic point of view, it
is debated whether civil liability for environmental damages constitutes an ap-
propriate means of preventive environmental policy. Whereas Siebert [1991]
argues that liability can generate ex ante incentives to take precautions against
uncertain environmental damages, for instance Schwarze [1996, 100 ff.] takes
Note, that rather than the compensation paid by the defendant 'damages' refers to
.the harm incurred. Compensatory payments will be referred to as 'liability pay-
ments'.-2
the view that various obstacles to the enforcement of,legal claims prevent the
civil liability from having significant allocafive effects.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the^economic consequences of the
legislative change brought about by introduction of the UmweltHG. In order to
do so, ideally it were necessary to obtain data on precautionary pollution
control measures and estimates of the environmental risk generated at the firm
level. Although, a rough measure could possibly be deduced from
environmental protection investments and reserves appropriated for
environmental protection as stated in the balance. sheets, accounting data
suffers "from several shortcomings. First, it is often impossible to separate
environmental protection items. More importantly, however, the evaluation of
balance sheet positions differs from economically correct costs. Under German
accounting and tax law numerous choices left to the firm's management as to
the evaluation and the appropriation of reserves for environmental protection.
Alternatively, the consequences of the UmweltHG could be assessed by
looking at actual compensation as recorded in legal disputes. Recorded legal
disputes, however, remain confined to ex post compensation which is estimated
to correspond to approximately one per cent of actual environmental damages
in Germany.
2 Furthermore, recordedblegai disputes omit substantial out-of-
court settlements (Feess-Dorr, Pratorius, Steger [1992, 39]). So far, no legal
dispute of litigation where compensation was claimed under UmweltHG has
been recorded. In the so-called PCB-case the UmweltHG only served as a
reference. The court decision was not based on the UmweltHG since the
emitting plant was not among those listed in Appendix 1 to the Act (Hohloch
[1994, 20]). The observed lack of claims under the UmweltHG could point to
the fact a failure of the law to provide a means of environmental protection.
Alternatively, it could imply that the UmweltHG provides such a clear-cut legal
framework, that parties settle their legal disputes out of court.
2 Neue Zuricher Zeitung, February 2, 1996 Umwelthaftung ein immer dringlicheres
Thema.-3-
In order to circumvent, the lack of appropriate data, this paper adopts an event
study approach and uses capital market data to assess the impact of the
UmweltHG's legislative change. The event study presented in this paper
evaluates the stock market response of the German chemical industry to a
series of events related to the change in the German environmental liability re-
gime. It is first analysed whether the expected profitability of chemical firms has
been affected by the revision-of the legal framework. If the UmweltHG induced
additional precautionary measures to be implemented and if firms would now
face sizeable liability payments, one should observe a decline in the returns to
chemical stocks. Secondly, it is examined whether the risk attached to future
profits in the chemical industry has been affected. If firms were facing a sub-
stantial liability risk due to the UmweltHG, one should see an rise in the invest-
ment risk attached to chemical stocks.
So far, no empirical study on the stockmarket response of environmental policy
issues has been carried out for Germany. Yet; a number of event studies on
environmental issues have been conducted for the United States.
3 Some
studies however fail to discern a negative impact on the industry under study
contemporaneous to an amendment in environmental law. Whereas, e.g. Doyle
[1985] finds a negative impact of the EPA Air Pollution Regulation on the cop-
per industry, the same regulation had a positive effect on returns in the cement
industry. This somewhat surprising result that the profitability has increased is
also obtained by Maloney, McCormick [1982]. Maloney, McCormick find that
the textile industry's stock value rose with the introduction of the OSHA cotton
dust standard. Similarly, an increase in the stock value of non-ferrous metal
smelting plants occurred at the time of a major air pollution control ruling by the
Supreme Court. For environmental litigation similar positive abnormal returns
are observed as the legal dispute evolves. Investigating a series of events in
3 Wallace, Watson and Yandle [1988], Moreschi [1990] for water pollution regula-
tions and Muoghalue, Robison and Glascock [1990] or Laplante and Lanoie [1994]
for environmental litigation.the highly publicised Agent Orange
1 and Diethystilbestrol (DES) litigation,
Viscusi and Hersch [1990] find a substantial negative impact of the announce-
ment of litigation. But as the litigation continued positive abnormal returns were
found, e.g. at the announcement of the settlement amount. For large scale en-
vironmental accidents, typically an adverse impact on the stocks of firms other
than one subject to the incident, is only observed once the market starts to ex-
pect a revision of safety regulations. As to the impact of the Bhopal accident on
the stock market performance of US chemical firms.other than Union Carbide
Blacconiere, Patten [1994] found a significant negative stock market reaction.
Thus, even if abnormal returns are identified that are associated with an en-
vironmental policy incident, these abnormal returris do not necessarily indicate
an decline in the profitability as conventional wisdbrn would suggest.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. A first attempt to evaluate the
role of environmental liability is made in Section 2. Section 3 describes the
event study methodology used here. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis
of the stockmarket response for the German chemical industry. Section 5 con-
cludes. '' •"
2. A First Evaluation of the Role of the UmweltHG
a. Civil Liability Prior to the Enactment of the UmweltHG
As. to the-role of environmental liability prior to the UmweltHG compensation
was .rnainly claimed under Section 22, par. 2 of the Water Resources Act
{Wasserhaushaltsgesetz, WHG, Feess-Dorr, Pratorius, Steger [1992]).
4
According to Feess-Dorr, Pratorius, Steger [1992]. the negligence-based tort
4,. Surprisingly, no instance was reported where a claim was made under Section 22,
par. 1 WHG. Thus, despite the heated public debate on liability based on conduct
(Handlungshaftung), it does not seem to relevant in practise (Feess-Dorr,
Pratorius, Steger [1992, 41]).provisions of the Civil Code {Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) do not bear much
relevance for environmental damages. The reason for the prevalence of the
WHG is seen in the strict liability it provides for in contrast to the tort law provk
sions which are based on negligence. The role of. the strict liability rule is also
supported by the evidence on litigation under the private nuisance law which
also follows a strict liability rule. Although under German nuisance law claims
are restraint by the requirement of land-related damages, the confinement to
neighbourhood, and non-accordance with local use, nuisance claims are
prominent vis-a-vis the negligence based tort rules. To sum up, prior to the en-
actment of the UmweltHG environmental litigation concentrated on water pollu-
tion. The prominence of water pollution could be due to the strict liability rule
applying to water pollution. In addition, the characteristics of water pollution
which are alleviate to prove causation compared to air pollution might have
played a role. Therefore, the extension of strict liability to air pollution and soil
contamination by the UmweltHG should have a substantial impact on environ-
mental litigation. This impact is further enhanced by the causality presumption
introduced by the UmweltHG.
b. The Pattern of Environmental Protection Investment
If the UmweltHG has generated substantial precautionary incentives, this
should be reflected by the pattern of environmental protection investment. In
particular, an increase in environmental protection investment should be ob-
served prior to the enactment of the UmweltHG in 1991. Moreover, such an in-
crease should be mainly found for air pollution control and waste management
(taken as a proxy for soil contamination) since for water pollution a strict liability
already applied before. A rise in water pollution control investment would point
to the importance of UmweltHG provisions other than the strict liability rule,
such as the causality presumption. Figure 1 shows an index of the environ-
mental protection investment undertaken by the private sector.Figure 1 — Pattern of Environmental Protectiorf Investment in Real Terms by
Different Environmental Media in the Private Sector, 1980-1992,
(1980 = 1.00)
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During the pre-ienactment period 1987-1990, air pollution control investments
were falling rapidly in real terms. Since air pollution is the dominating environ-
mental protection investment by the private sector, total environmental protec-
tion investment also started to decline beyond 1988. Water pollution related in-
vestments were approximately constant during the pre-enactment period. Only
waste management related investments increased from 1989 onwards. These
stylised facts do not suggests that the UmweltHG generates sizeable precau-
tionary incentives for air and water pollution. Only for waste related investment— 7 —
a hike contemporaneous to the revision of the German environmental liability
legislation can be noted.'However, the observed pattern is not exclusively de-
termined by the UmweltHG. Waste related environmental protection investment
is also shaped by the 1986 amendment to the Waste Act {Abfallgesetz AbfG)
and the Packaging Orclihance (Verpackungsordnung) of 1991. Substantial ad-
ditional precautions might not have been induced because of the stringent
German environmental protection standards already in place. Yet, under the
UmweltHG's strict liability further economic consequences could be brought
about by the liability payments polluter face even they took adequate precau-
tions. The event study presented in the following is able to identify such an im-
pact of the UmweltHG even if no additional precautions were taken.
3. The Event Study Methodology
This section briefly outlines the event study methodology adopted in this paper.
Basically an event study investigates the relationship between stock prices and
economic, political, or legislative events.
5 It starts out from the premise of ra-
tional expectations which implies that an unanticipated event affects investors'
expectations regarding the future profitability of firms' (Fama [1970], [1976])
and hence stock prices (Schwert [1981, 123]). In this study the (single index)
market model is used to characterise normal returns in the absence of the
event (Strong [1992]). The market model presumes a linear relationship
between return of a given security and the market return
[1] Rjf = «,• + ftjRrnt +
 vit
 wit
n i=1.->N and t=1,....,T,
5 The event study method was first, described by Fama, et al. [1969]. An early dis-
cussion of the use of capital market data to measure the effects of regulation is
given by Schwert [1981]. An overview of the methodological issues is provided, for
instance, by Henderson [1990] and Strong [1992]. The simulation studies by
Brown and Warner [1980], [1985], Dyckman, Phibrick and Stephan [1984], Collins
and Dent [1984] and Bernhard [1987] point to some of the econometric problems
involved.
 :— 8 —
where R^ denotes the return, on security i in period t and Rmt the return on the
market index. The regression coefficient a-, reflects the security specific return
component and /3, the market dependent return component. The unpredictable
component is denoted by vtf, with vn ~N(O,cf). The regression coefficient ft can
be interpreted as the risk of security i relative to the- risk of the market
portfolio.
6 .
Event and non-event periods are distinguished by means of dummy variables
(Maloney and McCormick [1982], Binder [1985]). Shifts in extra-market factors
and changes in the investment risk are captured by a differential intercept coef-
ficient yv and a differential slope coefficient y2 (see equation [2]), respectively.
[2] R,t =ai+piRmt +YvDt+Y2iRmtDt+vit i=1,..,N,t=1 T.^ T2
where D, represents the dummy variable being equal to one during the event
period and zero otherwise. If the marginal probability value of the t-statistic
indicates that the estimates of the dummy coefficients are statistically
significant, we can reject the null hypothesis that (on average) no abnormal
returns were experienced. Similarly, the hypothesis that the investment risk was
unchanged during the event period can be rejected for a significant t-statistic.
When analysing events that evolve over a longer period of time such as
legislative changes, it might be helpful to distinguish different subperiods.
7 Let
there be k announcements and let each dummy variable be denoted by Dw
equal to one during the period of the kth announcement and zero otherwise.
6 In an empirical estimation, the slope coefficients of the market model and the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) are the same. The CAPM, however, places an
additional constraint on the extra market return component a, - (1-fi)Rn and re-
quires that the siope coefficient is greater than zero. For the purpose of this study
the market model is sufficient.




 Rit = «/ + Pi
 Rmt'+ lYwPkt + lY2ki
 R
Again, y1Wl measures the abnormal return and Y2w
tn
e investment risk shift. The
distinction of different announcements relating to the same event allow, along
with,, a significance test at any individual announcements, to test a joint hy-
pothesis on whether abnormal returns are zero at all announcement dates.
Especially for legislative changes, which evolve over a longer period of time,
event date uncertainty poses a problem. Event date uncertainty is accommo-
dated by successively extending the event window starting out from the cover-
age in major newspapers. For none of the windows, a significant dummy coef-
ficient indicating abnormal returns for that window should be found.
If firms belong to the same industry and events are contemporaneous in calen-
dar time, cross-sectional correlation (Henderson [1990, 294ff.]) can render the
estimates inefficient. Instead of setting-up a Multivariate Regression Model,
cross-sectional correlation can be accounted for by examining a portfolio of af-
fected fifms (Schwert [1981, 129ff.])
Ml
where x] is the weight attached to a security i in the portfolio. Reformulating the
market model for a portfolio of assets yields
 ;
[5] Rpt =«p +ppRmt +vpt
The hypothesis that the average abnormal return in the event period is equal to
zero can then be estimated by the following equation
[6] RPt = a + p Rmt + yiP Dt + y2p Rmt Dt + £t
The estimated dummy coefficient ypk in equation [6] is equal to the arithmetic
average of the abnormal returns. Doyle [1985] compares the Muitivariate Re--10
gression Model (Binder [1985]) to the portfolio model by means of- simulated
events and finds that the portfolio method is as least as powerful as a Multi-
variate Regression Model.
4. The Sandoz Incident, Ensuing Revision of the German Environmental
Liability Legislation and the Chemical Industry
Having outlined the event study methodology, this section describes the set-up
of the empirical analysis. Subsequently, the estimation results for the German'
chemical industry are presented. The empirical analysis has tested the effect of
a series of events related to the change in the environmental liability regime on
the stock prices of a sample of firms in the German chemical industry. The
chemical industry is one of Germany's major industries. It accounts for about 5
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, for about 13 per cent of German ex-
ports, 10 per cent of German import, and for 8 per cent of the workforce in
manufacturing (OECD [1993, 153ft], VCI [1991,17]). The chemical industry is a
rather polluting industry. In 1990, the chemical industry has accounted for .62
per cent of sulphur dioxide emissions, 42 per cent of waste water discharged
directly, 17 per cent of production related waste, and 57 per cent of hazardous
waste of overall pollution generated by industry (OECD [1993]).
8 At the same
time, the chemical industry undertakes considerable environmental protection.
It accounts for about 40 per cent of the total environmental protection invest-
ment by manufacturing. The share of environmental protection investment in
total investment by the chemical industry is more than twice of the average of
manufacturing (DIW [1988, 375f.]). When the German liability legislation was
tightened considerable economic risks were expected for the German chemical
industry.
9
8 Note that for sulphur dioxide the fraction refers to all sectors, for water pollution
only to manufacturing. The figure for waste generation refers to 1987.
9 Handelsblatt, March 10, 1987 "Gegen ubertriebene Gefahrdungshaftung".11 -
b. The Data , .
The data employed in this study are the indices of German stock prices pub-
lished by the Federal Statistical Office (see Federal Statistical Office, Fachserie
9, Reihe 2).
1
0 The indices are calculated on the basis of the stock prices of
about 300 German companies listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Com-
pared to other indices, the index computed by the Federal Statistical Office re-
flects the structure of the different industries more accurately, since the stock
prices are capital weighted (Richard [1992]).
1
1 Furthermore, the index focuses
on the development of stock prices.
1
2
Returns are computed in continuously compounded form,
[7] R^lofffii/Pn-J
on a monthly basis using end of the month values. The reason for choosing a
monthly return interval is twofold. First of all, in analysing legislative events, the
high degree of uncertainty regarding the event date renders daily returns
superfluous. Moreover, the distribution of monthly .returns appear to.be closer




0 A detailed discussion of the computation of the indices, is given by Lutzel, Jung
[1984].
1
1 In a value weighted index, by contrast, the firms are weighted by their stock price.
Thus, firms with higher stock prices have more weight in the index. When looking
at economic consequences, however, there is no reason for attaching more weight
to firms with higher stock prices. Unless the weights vary with stock prices,
different weighting schemes do not change the abnormal performance detected.
1
2 Many of the widely used indices do not consider cash dividends. Richard [1992]
argues that stock prices already reflect dividend payments and one should
therefore beware of double-counting. The fact that the indices have not been
adjusted for dividend payments should have little effect on the estimates if the
dates at which the dividends are paid differ among firms contained in the portfolio.
1
3 Serial correlation is substantially reduced if monthly stock returns are used. Daily
data also is more prone to display conditional heteroskedacity (Ulschmid [1994]).
AutoRegressiveConditional Heteroskedacity effects typically vanish if monthly data
is used instead of daiiy data.-12-
b. The Legislative Process
The legislative process leading to the enactment of the UmweltHG is summa-
rised in the calendar of events (Table 1).















Extension of strict liability publicly discussed
Federal Government announces extension of strict liability to
air and soil pollution
World-wide Stockmarket Crash
Cabinet agrees on cornerstones of UmweltHG
Presentation of a UmweltHG proposal
First Reading in Bundestag
Bundesrat refuses to approve UmweltHG
Passing of the UmweltHG
UmweltHG enters into force
The legislative process was initiated by the Sandoz accident on November i,
1986. On November 1, 1986, a warehouse near Basle went on fire where
chemical products, basic substances, and high powered pesticides were
stored. Subsequently, heavy contamination of the Rhine river was
experienced.
1
4 Along the Rhine river, large fish populations died. Waterworks
had to stop their drinking water supply and on top of that breweries had to stop
their beer production.
1
5 Compensation paid to German claimants alone was in
excess of Sfr 71 million. Immediately, a heated public debate began'whether
1
4 A detailed description is given by FME [1987].
1
5 The Federal Government claimed compensation on behalf of the German victims.
In 1988, an out of court settlement was reached by which Sandoz accepted to pay
71 million Swiss Francs as compensation (Schwarze [1996, 93].-13 -Bibiiothek des instituts
German safety regulations were appropriate to prevent a similar accident in
Germany. In the following, a sequence of events signalled an increasing
probability of a tightening of environmental liability provisions. In March 1987,
the Federal Government formally announced its plans to extend strict liability to
air pollution and soil contamination. Following the formal announcement, the
Federal Ministry of the Environment (FME) and the Federal Ministry of Justice
(FMJ) worked out separate proposals for an Environmental Liability Act. The
proposals, which differed in a number of points,.were presented in summer
1988.
1
6 On May 24, 1989, the cabinet decided on the cornerstones of the
Environmental Liability Act. These cornerstones included a strict liability based
on plant-type, a reversal of the burden of proof by introducing a causality
presumption, the right to obtain information from the operators of polluting
plants and government authorities. Moreover, it was decided that liability
insurance should only be compulsory for a subset of plants. In the following,
1
the Federal government presented a formal draft. This draft was debated for
the first time in parliament {1. Lesung) in February 1990. The Act, did not pass
the upper house in October 1990 though, and the mediation committee
(VermittlungsausschuB) had to be called in. On December 10, 1990, the Act
was finally passed. It came into force January 1, 1991. The main difference
between the draft and the final UmweltHG is the provision limiting liability in
case of multiple plaintiffs to prorata-liability for damages caused within proper
operation which has been deleted. ..,:•.
The legislative process is characterised by three different stages: the Sandoz
incident,the agreement on the cornerstones of the draft, and the final enact-
ment of UmweltHG. The event window for the Sandoz incident, the Sandoz-
window, begins in November 1986. It ends in March 1987 when extension of
1
6 The main differences were that the FME disapproved a liability limted to specific
plant types, and did not regard the liability for ecological damages appropriate.-14-
strict liability was officially announced.
1
7 The official government
announcement is the last plausible point in time where it became obvious that
the German legislation would change. The second event window, which
captures the announcement of the basic characteristic of UmweltHG in May
1989, was chosen to end with the announcement of the cornerstones and to
extend back to January 1989. It is likely that the basic characteristics of the
compromise were known sometime before the official announcement. For the
same reason, for the enactment, a window of six months before the final
passing of the Act on December 10, 1990 was chosen.
1
8
c. The Impact of the Environmental Liability Act
In estimating normal returns for portfolio of chemical firms, equation [8] was es-
timated beginning 60 months prior to the Sandoz incident.
[8] CHEM, = u + p GESAMT, + vt
For the chemical industry, the sectoral index Sonstige Chemie was chosen. A




7 Interestingly, no significant stock market reaction was found for November 1986.
The reason might be that it took the market some time to realise that the Sandoz
accident would have consequences for German chemical firms. It even took the
Swiss stock market about 10 days to react to the accident (Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, "Sandoz-Aktien gefallen", November 11, 1986, p. 15). Moreover, it seems
to be a general characteristic of the chemical industry that its stock prices react
rather slowly to new information (May [1994, 283ff.]).
1
8 The length of windows was checked for sensitivity. The chosen periods are those
for which the most pronounced stock market reaction was found. Estimating for
: event, windows of different length should never yield a significant dummy coeffi-
cient. The results are very similar if other environmentally significant industries are
considered. The highest significance for the Sandoz dummy coefficient was ob-
tained for 1986:11 to 1987:2 and the window was adjusted accordingly.
1
9 The sample does not include the three very large multinational chemical firms
(BASF; Hoechst, Bayer). These firms are among the ten largest chemical firms in
the world and account for about one third of the turn-over of the German chemical
industry (VCI [1991, 17]). The reason for excluding these three stocks is twofold.
First, given their size these firms would dominate the portfolio. Second, given their
internationally diversified structure other factors outside the German legislation
might be infering so that the effects of UmweltHG cannot be disentangled.15-
For the market index the index Insgesamt was chosen. With an adjusted coef-
ficient of determination of 0.81, the market model offers a fairly good explana-
tion for the stock price movements in the chemical industry (see Table 2).
Regarding the profitability of the chemical industry two types of hypothesis are
tested: The first hypothesis tests whether substantial changes in the expected
costs were induced by tightened environmental liability are expected. Since
revision of German liability provisions was expected to be costly for the firms,Table 2— Estimates of the Impact of the Revision of Environmental Liability on the Chemical Industry's Specific Return














































*significant at the ten per cent level — **


















































































^significant at the one per cent level —-17-
th'e null hypothesis is that the incidents had no effect on the stock returns of
chemical firms. This null hypothesis would Be rejected if the events had a con-
siderable impact across firms in the chemical industry?'The second hypothesis
tests whether changes in the investment risk attached to future profits in the
chemical industry was affected by uncertain future environmental liability pay-
ments:"Accordingly, the second null hypothesis poses
1 that the events did not
affect the market dependent return coefficient. If the slope coefficient for the
chemical industry shifted,' it could be concluded that the event contained unan-
ticipated information on the investment risk of the chemical industry.
Estimation of Changes in Costs Attributed to UmweltHG •••••-,-••
In order to estimate whether a significant reduction in the profitability can be at-
tributed to one of the announcements, first an equation over the whole time
span 1981:1 to 1990:12 was estimated. Two different versions of this regres-
sion were estimated. The first regression tests whether the overall effect of all
three events is zero. The coefficient on the dummy variable estimates the aver-
age effect of the legislative change.
[9] • CHEM, = « + p GESAMTf + y Dt + vt . V
where.* indicates estimated parameters. The second regression tests whether
there was a significant stock market reaction at each event date. This is done
by estimating equation [1,0]
: •• -- I -:-'•• •••••:• ,, -. • '• ;. 3 • !:;:.:•- ;-
[10] CHEMf = a +p GESAMTf + 2fk
 Dkt + vt.
The regression coefficients and the respective t-statlstics are reported in Table
2. Employing three different dummy variables allows to' separate the distinct
features of the event windows. The Sandoz incident points to the revision of
environmental liability in Germany. If there were expected increases in total en-
vironmental costs, this should show up in lower stock returns. As first, a com-
pulsory liability insurance was put forward, in the Sandoz event period, the in--18-
vestment risk should not have changed. The formal announcement of the
cornerstones of the UmweltHG proposal revealed that a more conservative ap-
proach was going to be adopted. At this point it became clear that liability
would be limited to specific plant-types arid that the causality presumption
would not include plants that have been operated according to safety regula-
tions. It also became apparent that damage caused within proper operation
would be subject to liability. This package might have been good news, bad
news, or no news to the capital market compared to previous expectations.
With the cornerstone compromise it also became clear that insurance would
not be compulsory in general, Hence, the perception of investment risk of
chemical firms might have changed. The enactment, finally, conveyed
information regarding multiple defendants when the provision limiting liability to
pro rata in case of compliance to proper operation was deleted. Instead now
courts have to rely on the joint and several liability doctrine under the Civil
Code. This increases both the potential costs and the risk attached to liability.
The size of the dummy coefficients corresponds to what has been found by
other studies. For the joint estimation of all three events, it turns out that the
dummy coefficient is insignificant. Thus, investors may have viewed the addi-
tional costs imposed by the UmweltHG to be minor relative to the assets and
earnings of the chemical industry. This insignificance might also be due to off-
setting effects of the different windows. If one of the events leads to pessimistic
revision of expectations and another to an optimistic revision, the test of a joint
hypothesis would falsely support the hypothesis that there was no effect. In
fact, if events are represented by individual dummy variables, the signs of the
dummy coefficients differ. Two events, the Sandoz incident and the Corner-
stone window lead to an increase in the profitability of chemical firms. Now, the
Cornerstone event's misses the 5 per cent significance level only narrowly and
the Sandoz event misses the 10 per cent significance level by a small degree.
Only for the Enactment window, the coefficient has the negative sign that one
would expect when liability is tightened. Only that, the coefficient is19-
insignificant. Whereas it.seems to be plausible that the compromise among the
Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Ministry of the Environment was in
fact good news in the view of the market, the positive effect of the Sandoz
accident is harder to explain. The sign of the coefficient indicates that there are
abnormal gains following the Sandoz incident, which are sustained even during
the period over which safety regulations regarding chemical plants and liability
provisions in Germany were questioned publicly. It could be argued that the
German chemical industry had already taken adequate precautions. Indeed in
the public discussion the impression was conveyed that a similar accident
could not happen in Germany. If adequate precautions had already been taken
by German chemical firms, this would imply that the capital market did not
expect potential liability payments to result in a substantial cost increase.
2
0
Another reason for the insignificance of the dummy coefficients could be that
the parameters of the underlying model are unstable. A stylised fact found by
many empirical studies is that parameter instability can only be rejected for es-
timation periods up to five years (Ulschmid [1994]). Therefore, in addition, three
separate five-year regressions were run each ending with the event under
study. Although, regression results (reported also in Table 2) support the gen-
eral pattern identified above, there are some noteworthy changes. First, the
coefficient on the Sandoz event dummy becomes highly significant. At the
same time, the coefficient increases. Hence, positive impact for the Sandoz
accident is more pronounced in the five-year estimation. The results for the En-
actment window also change. The Enactment window now misses the ten per
cent significance level more clearly. For the Cornerstone window, the estimates
are similar to those obtained before. Again significant abnormal profits were not
found. Thus, taking parameter stability of the market model over five year pe-
20' The capital market could have perceived the Sandoz accident as pointing only to a
potential increase in the pollution control costs of foreign competitors. But even if
the German chemical industrial was already in good shape in terms of precaution-
ary pollution control measures, this would also rule out substantial liability pay-
ments.-20-
riod as granted, it can be concluded that the observed shifts are related to en-
vironmental liability rather than to changes in the underlying model.
Change in the Investment Risk Attributed id Environmental Liability
The coefficients reported in Table 2 point to a decline in the market related re-
turn component. This suggests a potential reassessment of the risk in the
chemical industry.'In order to test whether there were changes in the risk of the
chemical portfolio, the following equation was estimated,
[f\f CHEM, = a + |3 GESAMT, + y2 GESAMT, D, + Y,Dk, + v,.
A second regression was run with three different event dummy variables




If the differential slope coefficient were significant during one of the event
windows, .the market viewed the event as revealing unanticipated information
on the investment risk attached to returns in the chemical industry.
Testing first for the joint effect, the event slope shift coefficients turns out to be
insignificant. This result is independent of whether the change in industry spe-
cific return factors are captured jointly or separately (see Table 3). Only for the
Cornerstone window a significant differential slope coefficient is found. This is
consistent with the fact that in Spring 1989 it became obvious that liability in-
surance, would not be easily obtained nor be compulsory in all cases. However,
••••'• f. • • "'.•'••....
the sign of,the dummy coefficient points to a decrease in the risk attached to
investment in chemical stocks. The decreased risk might be due to fact that it
become obvious that chemical plants are among those who have to seek com-
pulsory coverage against liability risk. For the Sandoz incident no significant
change in the slope is found. This is consistent with the fact that initially a com-
pulsory liability insurance scheme was "planned.Table 3 — Estimates of The Impact of the Revision Environmental Liability on the Chemical Industry's Market Dependent









































































































































*significant at the ten per cent level — ^significant at the five per cent level — ***significant at the one per cent level —
SEE - standard error of estimate-22 -
Besides the dummy variable estimation reported in Table 3, Chow tests (Chow
[1960]) for structural breaks were performed.
2
1 The Chow-test only rejected the
hypothesis of no structural break for Cornerstone window and hence confirms
the aforementioned results.
d. Evaluation of the Regression Results
Summarising the regression results, no significant decrease in the profitability
of German chemical firms has been found as a consequence of the plans to in-
troduce a comprehensive strict liability for environmental damages. On the
contrary, increases in the stock market returns were experienced contempora-
neous to the Sandoz accident and the subsequent revision of liability and
safety regulations in Germany. An increase in returns wasjalso found for the
agreement on a more conservative approach to environmental liability.'The
only event for which a decrease in the profitability was established is the
enactment of the UmweltHG. However, the differential intercept coefficient is
insignificant, the regression results also convey the impression that the
riskiness of investing in the chemical industry compared to the market in fact
decreased despite the intentions to impose liability irrespective of the
precautions taken. However, a significant differential slope coefficient was
found only for the cornerstone agreement. At this time it became apparent that
liability insurance would not be compulsory in general. The capital market might
however have expected that chemical plants were among those for which
precautionary coverage was still planned to be compulsory and hence
perceived this to lower the investment risk.
.
2
1 For October 1986, the hypothesis of no structural break could not be rejected (F-
statistic: 1,518 (0,062)}. For January 1989, however, the Chow-test. indicates a
structural break (F-Statistic 1,89 (0,019)), whereas for July 1990 (F-statistic 0,588
(0,709)) a structural break seems unlikely.-23-
In evaluating these results critically, two sets of issues have to be considered.
The first set of issues is related to the details of the set-up of the event study.
The second set issues refers to statistical adequacy of the econometric model.
The Adequacy of the Event Windows
The first issue is the appropriate choice of the event windows. The correct de-
termination of the event window might in fact be a problem for later stages of
the legislative action. However, for the Sandoz incident, there can be little
doubt about the correct choice of the beginning of the event window. For
November no significant reaction was found. In order to accommodate event
date uncertainty, the window was then successively extended. Note that for
none of the windows, a significant dummy variable should be found.
Another concern is that of overlapping events. For instance, following the
Sandoz accident a catalogue of policy strategies to improve the safety of
chemical plants was presented by Federal Government on December 4, 1986.
Subsequently, the Hazardous Incident Ordinance (Storfall-Verordnung, 12th
BImSch-VO) was revised in May 1988 and reamended in 1991 to transform the
E.U Directive on the Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities into
German law. The direction of the abnormal profits is even more surprising if
these overlapping effects are considered.
Another potential source of error is that the event studied might have already
been anticipated at an earlier state. Again, this is not plausible for the Sandoz
accident. For the announcements during the legislative process, by contrast,
we cannot exclude that some developments were not anticipated at an earlier
stage. In particular, since the German government is obliged to cooperate with
the affected social groups when putting forward changes in environmental
legislation, some developments might have in fact been anticipated earlier.-24-
Finally, the portfolio method suffers from a weakness if the event studied has
differentiated effects on individual firms (Binder [1985]). Then the effects by
cancelling out each other, falsely support the hypothesis that the regulation had
no effect. In the case of environmental liability, however, the direction of the
effect should be homogenous within the German chemical industry even if it
differed from the impact on Sandoz itself.
2
2
The Adequacy of the Econometric Model
A number of studies show that the assumptions underlying the market model
might not hold (e.g. Coutts, Mills, Roberts [1994]). Therefore, the statistical as-
sumptions underlying the market model were tested. The results of these tests
are reported in the Appendix. Only the results obtained by using different
method to detect heteroskedacity are ambiguous in that some reject homoske-
dacity. Whereas testing for heteroskedacity by the Goldfeld-Quandt test
(Goldfeld, Quandt [1965]), did not indicate a rejection of homoskedacity, the
White test rejects homoskedacity at least for period 1981.10 -1986.10. The
reason for the rejection of homoskedacity are probably two outliers, 1986:5 and
1986:8, (see Figure A2). Equally, Ramsey's Regression Specification Error
Test (RESET, Ramsey [1969]) rejected linearity for the period 1981.10 to
1986.10. Again, the test statistic becomes insignificant, once the full period is
analysed. Therefore, although outliers might give rise to econometric probferns
for the estimation period, over the longer time span 198i. 10 to 1990;i2 for
which the event study is conducted this problem resolves. Overall the
econometric model chosen to estimate the impact of environmental liability
announcements on the chemical industry seems to be appropriate.
2
2 Asymmetric effects can be caused by an environmental accident, if the firm where
the accident occured.is also containedin the portfolio (Dowdel et al. [1990]). Re-
cent major environmental accidents in the German chemical industry show that the
stock prices of the firm where the accident occurred dropped, whereas the stock
prices of other firms in the industry rose (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January
30, 1996 "Zwei Chemieunfalle in kurzer Folge setzen Hoechst unter Druck").•25-
5. Summary and Conclusions
Given the nature of its production processes and the hazardous substances
used, the chemical industry was supposed to be severely affected by the intro-
duction of the German Umwelthaftungsgesetz. The empirical evidence pre-
sented in this paper, however, suggests that the legislative change (if any)
created by the UmweltHG.did not have a substantial adverse effect on the
chemical industry. This result is in line with the impression conveyed by the
pattern of environmental protection investment which does not point to a signifi-
cant impact of the UmweltHG on the aggregate level of environmental pro-
tection.
In particular, two sets of issues have been examined. First, it has been ana-
lysed whether the revision of the German environmental liability legislation fol-
lowing the Sandoz accident has had significant effects on the stock returns of a
portfolio of German chemical firms. Secondly, it has been investigated whether
this revision significantly affected the investment risk attached to these firms. If
environmental liability were to provide an effective meansof internalising envi-
ronmental risks, one would expect the profitability of affected firms to decline
for two reasons. First of all, if additional precautionary measures are induced
this should raise costs.. In addition, if firms have to face future liability payments
despite having taken, appropriate precautions -as under the strict liability the
UmweltHG provides for - this should also lower profits. Yet, the performance of
chemical stocks suggests that rather abnormal profits were expected contem-
poraneous to the revision of the German environmental liability legislation. Be-
sides from raising costs, the risk associated with future cash flows in the chemi-
cal industry should rise if chemical firms face substantial uncertain liability pay-
ments. But instead of an increase in the chemical industry's investment risk, the
estimates point to a decline in the investment risk contemporaneous to the
introduction of a strict liability for environmental damages.•26-
There are two potential explanations for the absence of an adverse effect on
chemical industry. First, the legal framework might not have changed to the
extent that was feared initially such that the UmweltHG was perceived as a fa-
vourable outcome. But even shortly after the Sandoz accident such a down-
ward revision of expectations could not be detected. Secondly, various obsta-
cles might prevent the enforcement of environmental liability claims under the
UmweltHG. Problems of enforcing liability claims, notably the difficulty of prov-
ing causation, impede the internalisation of environmental risks. Hence, in
presence of such impediments to enforcing legal claims, neither significant pre-
ventive measures nor liability payments will be generated. If the problems of
enforcing environmental liability claims were anticipated by the market, the en-
actment of the UmweltHG could have been good news compared to a substan-
tial tightening in safety regulation applying to chemical plants which was also
debated as an alternative at the time.
Thus, the findings of this paper do not indicate that there was a substantial
negative impact of the UmweltHG on the profitability or the investment risk of a
portfolio of German chemical firms. This result is even more surprising because
extensive media coverage of the Sandoz accident raised the public awareness
of the potential risk of chemical plants and also led to a decrease in the time it
takes chemical stocks to react to unanticipated disruption of chemical plants.
Hence, the findings of event study presented in this paper support a rather
pessimistic view on the economic consequence of the UmweltHG.- 27 -
Appendix
Table A1 Environmental Protection Investment in the Goods Producing






- Mineral oil refining
- Quarrying and Processing
of Stone and clay
- Iron Production




- Manufacture of pulp, paper
and board
- Mechanical Engineering
- Manufacturing of Road
Vehicles











































































































































































Source: Federal Statistical Office Statistical Yearbook, current volumes. For
1993 Pan-German Figures.
The Adequacy of the Econometric Model
Testing for stationarity of returns by using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
(Dickey, Fuller [1981] showed that a unit root was rejected for returns to the-28-
chemicai portfolio nor to the market portfolio at the 1 per cent level (using
MacKinnon critical values).
Autocorrelation of residuals does not seem to pose an econometric problem in
estimating the market model with data used here. However, as the Durbin-
Watson test reported in Table 2 an 3 presupposes homoskedacity and struc-
tural constancy which turn but to pose a problem here, the Breusch-Godfrey
Lagrange Multipliertest (Breusch [1978], Godfrey [1978]) and the Ljiung-Box Q-
statistics for residual serial correlation were performed. Both confirmed that no
autocorrelation cannot be rejected (see Table A2).-29






































































Often, for the market model the assumption of homoskedastic error terms is not
given. Missong and Seppelfricke [1993] find that for monthly data, the German
stock market the assumption of homoskedastic residuals has to be rejected.
Testing for heteroskedacity by the Goldfeld-Quandt test (Goldfeld, Quandt-30-
[1965]), did not indicate a rejection of homoskedacity.
2
3 Another heteroskedac-
ity test - the White test - rejects the hypothesis of homoskedacity at the one
per cent level for the estimation period 1981.10 -1986.10.
2
4 Unlike the
Goldfeld Quandt test, the White test does not presuppose an ordering of the
observations with respect to the explanatory-variable the supposedly causes
heteroskedacity. The rejection of homoskedacity vanishes, however, once the
full ten year period is analysed. The reason for the rejection of homoskedacity
is probably the outliers 1986:5 and 1986:8 (see Figure A1). In the larger
sample, the importance of: these outliers diminishes and so does
heteroskedacity (see Coutts, Mill, Roberts [1994, 156ff.]). Equally, the
Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) as proposed by Ramsey [1969]
equally rejected linearity for the period 1981.10 to 1986.10. Again-, the test
statistic becomes insignificant, once the full periodis analysed. Thus, although
outliers might give rise to econometric problems for the estimation period, over
the longer time span 1981.10 to 1990.12 for which the event study is conducted
this problem resolves.
It is essential for the event study methodology that the estimated model pa-
rameters are stable over the estimation period and the event period. The
CUSUM-test (Brown, et al. [1975]) was performed, since it does not require to
specify exact breakpoints. The CUSUM-test did hot indicate parameter insta-
bility for the estimation nor for the full period. A particular point in time at which
2
3 The Goldfeld Quandt test seems appropriate, because the variance in the error
terms is likely to be driven by the rates of change in the market index. The values
reported in Table A2 refer to omitting 20 observations in the middle.
2
4 The White test is also regarded as a genera! misspecification test. If the para-
meters of the market model are varying over time, but are estimated as being con-
stant, residuals are heteroskedastic. Therefore, a test for heteroskedacity can be
interpreted as a test for parameter constancy.-31 -
Figure A1 — Relationship between Rates of Returns to the Chemical Industry
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a structural break might have occurred is the world wide stock market crash.
Testing for a structural break, in 1987:10 by means of the Chow test, the hy-
pothesis of no structural break cannot be rejected.
The prevalence of so-called AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedacity
(ARCH) effects frequently constitutes a problem in empirical research into fi-
nancial time series (see for instance Funke [1994], Dankenbring and Misssong
[1996]).
2
5 ARCH refers to the fact that often a period with a high volatility of the
returns is followed by more stable return patterns, in this case the variance in
error terms depends on last period's error term variance and heteroskedacity
follows an autoregressive conditional process. Figure A1 indicates that there
might be some variation in the volatility of the monthly rates of change of the
stock price index both" for the chemical industry and of the market as a whole.
Yet, the'Lagrange-Multiplier test proposed by Engle [1982] for ARCH (1), how-
ever, did not reject no autocorrelation for one of the periods.
2
5 Dankenbring and Missong [1996] find significant ARCH effects for monthly returns
German stocks.-32-
Testing, finally, for normality of the distribution of the residuals/the Jarque-
Bera statistic (Bera, Jarque [1981]) cannot reject normality.
2
6 Overall, the
regression model chosen to estimate the impact of different environmental
liability events on the German chemical industry seems to be appropriate.
Table A3— Firms contained in the portfolio for the Chemical Industry
(December 30, 1991)
Akzo Faser AG
Altana Industrie-Aktien und Anlagen AG
Beiersdorf AG
















Source: Federal Statistical Office Fachserie 9, Reihe 2, S.1, Index der
Aktienkurse - Lange Reihen.
2
6 Similar results have been obtained by Ulschmid [1994].-33
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